The Weekly N&C for August 25th, 2008

What is this “Belarus”, or more directly, why is it *the* danger to the EU right now?

Geopolitics has gone more than a little out of fashion in International Studies these days, to no great surprise. As a concept, the relentless application of elements of this concept to every interaction between Eurasia and the rest of the world dulled the edge of what is in many ways a very valuable tool for understanding capability and motivation. Said applications and misapplications have attempted to simplify modern conflicts and questions as widely variant as: the Viet Nam War(s); movements toward European Unity; the break-up of the Soviet Union; and even the motivations for the Islamist movements that feed the ongoing War. But what Geopolitics was invented to explain, and what it is still best used in application to, is the vital role of Eastern Europe as the pivot upon which the fates of both Europe and Greater Asia turns.

Mackinder’s conceptual opposition to Mahan’s assertion that Sea Power was dominant in both war and economics was in part based on his apparent belief that given sufficient infrastructure, the large Heartland at the center of the Eurasian landmass could be equally efficient at transporting armies (or goods) as the ocean networks of sea-lanes and ports. It should be also considered that both he and Mahan wrote *before* the viability of airpower and air transport had been asserted. Still, the importance of land forms, river lines, and most of all the shape of borders in their relation to lines of transportation can not and should not be simply set aside even in this air-mobile age. In particular, salients (borders protruding into or out of an otherwise contiguous territorial space) are of immediate importance when analyzing geopolitical risks to nations, and corridors (in this usage meaning allowed pathways of movement through states to reach an otherwise inaccessible territory) are both the bane and boon of planners.

Let us dispense with corridors first, as they are of interest but not vital need in the further discussion. The bar-none *at risk* corridor of action in the Global War on Terror is the logistical pathway into Afghanistan. There are several, including air overflight permissions and such, but the key corridor is the overland route through Pakistan by which the bulk of material transport required to support NATO and U.S. military operations must move. This qualifies as a “tenuous” at best, although “endangered” would likely be more accurate, route. So long as Pakistan remains cooperative, and makes some attempt to keep threats at a distance from the corridor, this route remains usable. Were Pakistan to collapse into civil war, or turn openly hostile to the Afghan campaign, the Western Allies would be faced with the choice of losing this corridor or being forced to take military action to keep it open, with neither being of any benefit to the outcome of the Afghan campaign. With that vivid image in mind, it should be fairly easy to keep in mind that: (a) corridors are what you have to have when you don’t have what you want – contiguity, and (b) any time a military or economic effort can be determined to be (or reduced to by other action) a corridor, the opposing power is a single stroke away from denying the effort itself.

But where in all this academic talk is any connection to Belarus? For that matter, where in the heck *is* Belarus? Oh, it can be pointed to on a map, *here*. That isn’t the hard part. Where it challenges the mind is when the question is rephrased to be “what”, not “where”.

You see, to those whose national histories are a bit longer than oh say 232 years, it matters to say “what” a country is, and in this particular case it is a collection of principalities generally considered to be the bulk of White Ruthenia and all of Black Ruthenia. At least, that was the first English language name given to the region in the late 16th Century. The key part being “Ruthenia”, a Latin term given to the various Slavic peoples of the East and their territories outside Mongol thrall, that while often confused in the period with what we now call “Russia” is both culturally and ethnically different. Further confusion does come from the Polish use of “Rus” to mean “Ruthenian”, but let that be that.

Now in the time of those first English writings about White Ruthenia, that territory and a whole lot more were part of the dominant Eastern European territorial power of the age, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Historical Map. In the specific case of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, you can see by that map reference that what modern maps label “Belarus” was a rather substantial (and integral) part of the holding. So when did this whole idea that “White Russians” lived there come into being? Well, thanks to a little desire for territorial aggrandizement, the term was coined for use by Kate the Great… er… that would be Екатерина II Великая (Catherine II, the Great), ruler of Imperial Russia from 1762 to 1796 and one of the chief architects of the annihilation of Poland as a state for roughly 150 years. Now she wasn’t the only villain of the piece, and actually the Prussians had more at stake in the whole plot, but the result as far as Ruthenian lands went was entirely a Russian plot. Here is a competent summary of how she and the other “Black Eagles” pulled it off. But the key point to remember is that just as the people of (Western) Ukraine were dubbed “Lesser Russians” (vs. the Muscovite “Great Russians”), the peoples of European Ruthenia got dubbed “White Russians” purely to provide an ethnic claim to taking their territory and adding it to Imperial Russia. And this two-fold maneuver, combining the taking of most of Ruthenia with other acquired territory west of the Dnieper River (in present-day Ukraine), gave Imperial Russia what it really wanted: a very large salient, so large as to be arguably an integral and contiguous border space, that gave military and commercial access to *both* Central and Baltic Europe (the latter, a gain from landward).

Now it didn’t take very long for the entire rest of Europe (except maybe Portugal) to figure out that perhaps it was a mistake to let Russia get her foot in the front door. Counter efforts were constantly attempted, most being tried on what is considered Polish territory now, and one (the interwar Second Polish Republic) had a bit of success at survival to say the least. That all came to naught, for in the end, the massive effort that was the Soviet Union came to both *use* the power of the salient to carve out a post WWII Satellite-Empire in Eastern Europe, and then to *lose* it through unspeakably bad management… except, they didn’t lose Belarus.

It was a near thing, actually, that they didn’t. Since the 1950’s the Soviet regime had taken all manner of steps to try and expunge the idea of the region being separate from Russia, and many (like banning official use of the native language, and shooting much of the local intelligencia) were widely despised once they became known. The sheer joy of seeing the disintegration of the Soviet Union did sweep through the “Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic”, which had been given separate “nationality” inside the Soviet Union, and there were some amazing movements toward separation. Sovereign authority was declared on July 27th, 1990, and it became the Republic of Belarus on August 25th, 1991. A national constitution granting powers to a President that included the functions of Prime Minister was enacted in March of 1994, and…

…and then the wheels started to come off the cart.

An absolute political unknown, who got elected to the Supreme Soviet (Parliament) of the new Belarus in 1990, built a reputation of “fighting corruption” and was party to bringing down the Speaker of the Parliament (Stanislav Shushkevich). This otherwise unheralded newcomer by the name of Alexander Lukashenko became a candidate for the first Presidential Election, and after a run-off, won with 80% of the vote. Oh, and to answer before you ask, yes his name is “Lukashenka” when Romanized from Belarusian. “Lukashenko” is the form taken from Russian. Does that give you a hint where this is going? Good.

This fellow is a classic post-Soviet opportunist, and he did a pretty good job of playing West vs. East in his first few years in power. But after being re-elected in 2001 and 2006 in elections that would make Hugo Chavez and Robert Mugabe proud, his autocracy has pretty well worn out its international welcome. The U.S. Congress actually tired of his gamesmanship back in 2004 and passed the Belarus Democracy Act, which allows for funding of pro-democracy opposition. Predictably, this is considered insulting by the Lukashenko regime, and in return that government has pretty much decided to treat anything but neo-socialist (and generally far away) regimes as enemies. At the same time, the mask came off the doll as far as relations with Putin’s Russia: Since January 26th, 2000, a functional Union with the Russian Federation has existed. Since May 27th, 2008, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Union has been Vladimir V. Putin.

That is right. *That* Putin.

So put aside any and all thoughts of fair Ruthenia being a separate nation, one day to find freedom and acceptance in Europe again.

Instead, look at a map very carefully, and see that as long as Russia holds the salient that is Belarus under its domination, Russia holds a dagger that can reach anywhere from the West of Ukraine to the southern approaches of the Baltic States, with trivially easy access to Poland and the possibility of reopening a corridor to Kaliningrad (Koenigsberg).

Given the thinking demonstrated recently by V. Putin, it is reasonable and prudent to consider that he might just use it, too.

***
End Notes:

Several map citations and one text reference were made from Wikipedia. As always, check the sources cited on any item referenced from there.

A very substantial and regularly updated source of information on Belarus can be found at Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty‘s web site under their Belarus tab. Here’s the link:
RFE/RL Belarus
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