The Weekly N&C for August 11th, 2008

When They Build Their Foreign Policy on the ‘Enemy of my Enemy’ …

It is one of the axioms of the Realist school of geopolitics, that when confronted with an enemy, it is desirable to seek assistance from others who also treat your foe as an enemy. Differences between the new-found friends can be put aside to make common cause, and in some cases, this happens. But history is replete with cases of ‘making a deal with the devil’ that compromises the standing of one or both the new-found friends. Worse, the very premise can be called to fault by the very fact that it ignores real grievances in the name of opportunism. Better by far would be to have exhausted the other three of the four permutations of the enemy-friend paradigm.

The simplest permutation is the ‘Friend of my Friend’ which, unless your ‘Friend’ was an extraordinarily poor judge of character, should result in the opportunity to make a new-found friend of equal advantage to both you and your ‘Friend’. In practical terms, this is called Extension of Membership in an Alliance and is the standard method of recruiting a coalition greater than any standing alliance. It is also nearly trivial to established States, but it bears mention in the case of newly recognized States seeking to establish a place in the international order. Timor Leste’s expansion of relationships from its favorable basis with Australia to closer ties with Japan (a 'Friend' of Australia) fits loosely into this model.

Likewise, the “Enemy of my Friend” usually leads to a simple judgment of what relationship to seek, albeit a hostile one. Indeed, the promise of taking such a view of a third-party’s relationship with your ‘Friend’ is the basis of meaningful defensive alliances. Where this gets statesmen into trouble is the case of having to choose between two unrelated ‘Friends’ that come into conflict, but it is arguable that a competent Foreign Ministry should be aware of such ‘Two-Friends’ conflicts as they arise and be in mediating before the issue comes to blows. Several case studies in recent times are available, including the Falklands Conflict, although in examination that case resolved itself as there was only one true ‘Friend’ involved.

The ‘Friend of my Enemy’ is a logical extension of the obvious, that anyone who supports my foe is likely not someone worthy of being treated as anything other than just another foe. But the allowed nuance of that third-party not being in *actual* conflict is the usual fodder of diplomats responsible for putting lipstick on the pig of their nation having provided aid and comfort to one party of a conflict publicly. For those nations provided with better spies than diplomats, being a third-party to a conflict in secret makes it very difficult to recognize, much less pin responsibility on them. This is also the favored way to engage in Proxy Wars, where four states (or more) align into an apparent conflict of two lesser states which is in fact the proxy for two greater and opposed states’ conflict.

So much for the recapitulation; there had best be some sort of application to all this. Very well, here it is. Statesmen, diplomats, policy -planners and upper-tier intelligence analysts are all responsible to their State for providing recommendations on whom to make deals with and on explaining the relevance of the intricate network of relationships and obligations that make up real world statecraft. The ability to clearly state to national leaders the real status of the network had best be the most important goal of all those whose place in life is to provide informed advice. Pointing out in no uncertain terms which nations align where regarding what crisis or conflict is the advisor’s job. Making policy *and then following it* is the leader’s job, without conflating separate conflicts, without falling into the trap of the international chess game image. There may well be on “those who are with us and those who are against us”, but that never lines up as just the two colors of chess pieces on the board. It was never close to that even in the great polarizing conflicts of the 20th Century, and it certainly isn’t amenable to that image now.

Here are some lessons from the archives:

The compromise of principle required for Great Britain to be in the same alliance as the Soviet Union (opposing the Axis) was pure opportunism. Just as soon as the Soviets became the “Enemy of my Enemy”, it would have been pretty close to suicidal to ignore the possibility of cooperation. But, and this is the big “but”, there was a reasonable recognition on the part of the British government that calling the Soviet Union a ‘Friend’ was at least a risk. The Roosevelt administration in the U.S. never got that understanding, never effectively moved to reduce cooperation as the course of the European part of the war became predictable, and left itself wide open to all matter of abuses of the relationship in the last year of the war. This persistent blindness to the absence of ‘Friendship’ on the part of the Soviets (who saw it all a “useful”, but never deluded themselves as to the relationship’s depth) led to repeated compromises of principle by Roosevelt which once begun almost preordained concessions at Yalta and abominations like Operation Keelhaul. The only clear case of clear-wittedness on the part of the Americans was the refusal to supply B-29 bombers as part of Lend-Lease, and even that became moot within years with the TU-4 copy being a success. The Truman administration did come to see the folly of the relationship, but perhaps a year later than would have allowed for a reversal of Roosevelt’s compromises.

Again from World War II, here is a case in a reverse perspective. France and The Netherlands were entirely beholden upon Great Britain for any liberation after their respective defeats by Nazi Germany, or in the terms of our discussion above, Great Britain was their last ‘Friend’ (irrespective of capability, the British being pressed within an inch of defeat themselves). Words of sympathy not withstanding, American considerations of the need to enter the War in Europe were based on their relatively recent close relationship with Great Britain, not on promises of coming to the defense of either France or The Netherlands. Indeed, the fiercely anti-colonial stance of the Roosevelt administration almost precluded a relationship of mutual respect and trust. But as soon as opportunity (and necessity, regarding the Dutch East Indies) presented itself with the American entry into the war, both the Free French and Free Dutch governments-in-exile happily engaged with the deep-pocketed Americans to supply the means for their homelands’ liberation. But they didn’t engage in the same way. The Free French made it fairly clear to the Americans that this was a relationship of convenience, one that would be paid quid-pro-quo with America gaining vital assistance in North Africa and the South Pacific islands for providing France the means to take pride of place in the liberation of the French homeland and assume parity to Great Britain in the Alliance. When there was pressure from the Americans, they played the British off against them, and vice versa when there was pressure from the British. The Free Dutch made no attempt to parley advantage and remained an element of the British force structure except in the brief ADBACOM naval structure, and that was only in the Pacific theater. They received American materials and supplies, and took their place in the line sure of American respect and ‘Friend’ status. The difference in engagement was telling in the long term. Yes, the Axis was defeated world-wide. But while both the liberated French and Dutch were provided the means to begin to reassert control over their former Asian colonies, the influence of the Roosevelt administration’s anti-colonialism remained, and both were pressured almost immediately to give up the fight when independence wars broke out. The Dutch were outright betrayed in the Dutch East Indies as the Americans moved their support to recognizing the rebellion as soon as they realized it wasn’t a communist plot, and the Dutch were simply unprepared militarily and more importantly diplomatically to deal with the loss of a ‘Friend’. The French were also being abandoned regarding their former colonies, but love-him-or-hate-him de Gaulle and his government were at least prepared for American disapproval and made a respectable effort of retaining their colonies (for a decade, but that loss came for different reasons). The policy of cooperating but not blindly befriending the Americans served French interests better by far than the Dutch approach of ‘playing on the team’.

The sort of clarity of vision that would reveal those distinctions is a thing most certainly lacking from the diplomatic and politics-international of the U.S. government today. Whether in matters of how America deals with other States, or in American expectations of how other States will relate to America, political blindness and the conviction that domestic politics trumps international relationships continues to bemuse outside observers.

There are several relationships utterly clouded by American missteps right now. Most are not past the point of recovery, but an application of even the simple permutations discussed above makes prudent course far easier to perceive:

South Korea: It is less than honest to take a ‘Friend” relationship for granted. They see America first and foremost as the ‘Enemy of my Enemy’ vis-à-vis the North Koreans, and America should see them as students of de Gaulle. But the opportunity to cement the ‘Friend’ parts of the relationship with lasting peer-level ties only comes when governments amenable to improving the relationship are in power, on both sides. Completing the transfer of national defense command and passing a Free Trade Agreement are only going to make things better if governments in both countries can use them to show that real friendship can be built. Otherwise, between nationalist (and leftist) tendencies in South Korean political thought and American factions willing to treat them as rivals, the South Koreans are frankly better served looking for better protection than the bilateral relationship promises… and that certainly doesn’t serve American interests.

Latin America (part1): This one is tricky, so bear with me. Iran is an avowed ‘Enemy’ of America. Iran has a ‘Friend’ in Lebanese Hezbollah (if not an utter toady). Lebanese Hezbollah has relationships in the expatriate communities present in the Tri-border Area of South America and in Venezuela. In the case of Venezuela, the current government makes considerable political hay from opposing American interests. That same Venezuelan government is a sponsor of the current brand of South American Communism, backing influenced governments (in Bolivia and Ecuador) and engaging with the more traditional Communist Parties in Cuba and Nicaragua. Does this make Nicaragua’s current regime an ally and ‘Friend’ of Iran? Not a chance. It makes them opportunists looking for Venezuelan and Iranian money to line their pockets. Immoral, yes, but a separate opponent of American interests, not a ‘Friend of our Enemy’ Iran. They are a part of a linkage that can be cut, and managed separately. Are the client states of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Socialism ‘Friends’ of Iran? Again no, they are not, but as those States are more closely linked to Venezuela right now, there is more risk of them acting in Venezuela’s perceived interest. *That* interest is served by Venezuela being a ‘Friend’ of Iran as the Chavez regime gains from the unfettered support they can buy or be gifted from Iran and they perceive no threat from Iran to Venezuelan interests. Iran sees the ‘Enemy of my Enemy’ in Venezuela’s opposition to American interests, and the opportunist moment to use the access to Venezuelan banks, airports, and diplomatic documentation to further its own goals against American (and indeed Western) interests. This linkage is one of immediate peril to the U.S. and should be treated as such. Venezuela itself is not the peril, but the linkage certainly is.

Latin America (part2): The Uribe government in Colombia has been treated in part by the American government as the ‘Enemy of my Enemy’, where the ‘Enemy’ of note is the narco-terror elements of both the arch-left and arch-right in the Andean region. Recent events have proven however that Colombia is a ‘Friend’ in their own right, an ally and a loyal one. That is the way Colombia wants to see the U.S. as well, and recognition of that fact would serve America well. Strengthening that linkage has begun, but more needs to be done. Real alliance, Free Trade Agreement, and the sort of discussions over differences befitting the conduct of two mutually respectful States is in order.

Eastern Europe and the Black Sea coast: Let the example of the Baltic States be our guide there. Honestly grateful for European Union and American support and now alliance, there are no better ‘Friends’ of the West to be found now than the Baltic States. Their capacity to contribute is limited by their size, but pound per pound they are as good as they come. The opportunity to provide the same commitment, at the same or lesser risk, to Ukraine and Georgia is in hand. Both those States have made the intellectual adjustment of seeing the West as ‘Friend’ instead of “Enemy of my Enemy” (the ‘Enemy of the first part being the threat of Russian Imperialism reborn), and have made commitments in social, economic, political, and military terms to show that ‘Friendship’, especially when asked to do so. America has asked, and they have answered to the best of their abilities. The failure to recognize that would be the most shameful betrayal since the Lancaster House Accords, and less able to be rationalized.

There are lessons complex in even the simplest labels of diplomatic real-politics. The Americans, and the West in general, would be better served in what ever conflict or crisis that is occurring by understanding the linkages of interests, ‘Friend’ or ‘Enemy’, and doing a far better job of standing by the true ‘Friends’ they have.