Syriaous Trouble

Readers here might well remember a discussion of Japan's need to replace its long-serving F-4EJ kai  Phantom II jet fighters, and how in comments it was pointed out that they lacked survivability against any reasonably modern surface-to-air-missile defenses...

Well, the Turks just got a lesson about just such a problem. Crew still unaccounted for. Ouch.

This is also further evidence, unfortunately, that the regime in Syria thinks they are going to get away with whatever they do in the course of prosecuting their little Civil War, er, irregular revolutionary uprising.

Somehow, I suspect the Turks will have something to say about that...

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Important note for those concerned about how this fits in with the obligations under the North Atlantic Treaty (NATO) to support member-state Turkey. The short form is: the Middle East south of Turkey is out-of-region, so any Article 5 claim by Turkey would be based on Syrian attacks into Turkey... which haven't clearly happened yet. But, if I recall correctly, Article 4 calls for mutual assistance and that may well be coming Turkey's way upon request, and lots of it.

Calling in support

I'm on a deadline this fine evening (local time) and as such won't be going through sources until much later. So I'm calling in support:

Here's the link to the always superb NightWatch for today. The topics are Azerbaijan-Israel, Syria and Mali. The writing is by and for analysts, but I think these topics will be of some general interest as well. I haven't even touched on the Azerbaijan story here (mostly out of concern that I'd be too angry at the time of the leak), but it has become widespread open-source so I don't mind linking to a discussion of it now.

Enjoy!

PKK a Syrian tool?

That's what the Turks are claiming. Shades of 1998... although Assad-the-elder sold out the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that time to avoid a war with Turkey.

Some notes:

The PKK are a former Soviet tool and the worst of the bunch in the category of Kurdish nationalist movements. The more main-line parties in Iraqi Kurdistan realize they are disaster magnets and generally avoid even the appearance of cooperation with them.

The Turks are currently seeking a casus belli to justify intervention into Syrian territory... because they'd rather keep the Syrian rebel and refugee problems off Turkish soil (as much as possible) and they want to dictate the nature of the next Syrian government(s).

The Assad regime in Syria has a history of using national minorities as pawns.

The Kurdish 'nation' would, given the chance, love to have Eastern Syria... or Western Kurdistan... with 2 million Kurdish residents to be united with Iraqi Kurdistan in the pursuit of a viable nation-state.

The anti-Assad Syrian National Council has not cooperated with Kurdish anti-Assad organizers, apparently at the demands of the Turks.

Which seems to mean:

The Turkish fear of Kurdish national aspirations not only prevents them from raising a viable second front against the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War, but may actually invite pushing the Syrian Kurds further into the arms of the regime to justify an intervention that has little to do with the eventual fate of the Kurds.

If, on the other hand, an obviously non-PKK faction could be raised in Eastern Syria and supported from Iraqi Kurdistan, the fall of the Assad regime could be greatly accelerated. But to do that involves Iraq and plays with nationalist fire.

Would either result better the situation? Tough call...

...working with him, yeah, that's it.

While enduring the BBC World's Impact news program this evening, I once again had the infuriating experience, eh hem, pleasure of watching one of the world's great front-men for his bosses' policies, Russian Foreign Minister S. V. Lavrov. When asked at a press conference about the situation in and regarding Syria, he fielded it in terms of Arab League and United Nations Special Envoy Kofi Annan (yes, former UNSecGen) 's presentation of the results of his 'peace plan' to the UNSC, due today... Lavrov said:

"...we are working with him every day."

Call me a biased opinion, but my first reaction was "SO? You've been working with him every day for decades. Russia and UN apparatchiks..."

Catch the drift of what I'm saying?

Good.

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As long as we are at least tangentially on a Freedom for Syria topic, I would be remiss to not mention the superb back-and-forth between Michael Ledeen and Andrew C. McCarthy yesterday on what to do or not do about Syria. If you make the time to read it all, and I hope you do, please make the effort to backtrack from M. Ledeen's last pronunciamenti to the very first link in their chain of discussion. Two very, very sharp gents taking a very civil difference of opinion about the way forward about Syria and running it to ground in one of the best considered analyses-by-competition I've read in a long while.

"...credible threats against his personal safety"

News item: U.S. Ambassador Robert Ford has returned to Washington D.C. because of "...credible threats against his personal safety in Syria".

Comment: Entirely predictable.

The threats, not the return.

Between the documented conduct of the Assad clique at the head of Syria and the fact that the functional incompetence of some of the people running their mouths at DeptState has made it impossible for the American Ambassador to claim an exclusively humanitarian interest in the betterment of the Syrian Opposition, it was only a matter of time before the regime in Damascus withdrew any pretense of diplomatic protection for Amb. Ford.

Yes, if this was a case of supporting anti-government demonstrations in some place like Luxembourg, one could expect the "nicety" of having the American Ambassador declared unacceptable and then sent packing. But most of the world isn't "nice" and Syria is pretty far up the "not nice" list.

At this point, I'll confess I'm happy he's out of the target zone (at least for now) because I've seen what a nightmare it is for RSO's and "other government agencies" personnel to keep an Ambassador alive if said Ambassador persists in doing things contrary to self-protection... *but*... there are some things that are risky to do that simply are in the national interest of the nation said Ambassador represents and thus need to be done. Moreover, an Embassy is not just the Ambassador (case in point); all the other personnel are also *or more so* at risk. Bringing Amb. Ford out may be be the best move available right now, but I'll argue that move is: forced; a half-measure; to the detriment of American support for the Opposition; (and was) likely avoidable.

Doing it wrong

Josh Rogin at Foreign Policy's "The Cable" has the details on how the Obama administration badly bungled the Iraq SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) negotiations. Here are two key points:

She (M.C. Sullivan) said that the administration's negotiating strategy was flawed for a number of reasons: it failed to take into account Iraqi politics, failed to reach out to a broad enough group of Iraqi political leaders, and sent contradictory messages on the troop extension throughout the process.

"From the beginning, the talks unfolded in a way where they largely driven by domestic political concerns, both in Washington and Baghdad. Both sides let politics drive the process, rather than security concerns," said Sullivan.

and

Administration sources and Hill staffers also tell The Cable that the demand that the troop immunity go through the Council of Representatives was a decision made by the State Department lawyers and there were other options available to the administration, such as putting the remaining troops on the embassy's diplomatic rolls, which would automatically give them immunity.

"An obvious fix for troop immunity is to put them all on the diplomatic list; that's done by notification to the Iraqi foreign ministry," said one former senior Hill staffer. "If State says that this requires a treaty or a specific agreement by the Iraqi parliament as opposed to a statement by the Iraqi foreign ministry, it has its head up its ass."

This is a case study in making damn sure that petty and unimportant things override strategic imperatives, one that likely Americans will one day rue. I'd say the same about Iraqis, but the lesson of history in that region is that very few fools around those parts live long enough to rue their mistakes. But the blame for this outcome, if one were to wish to place it, should not fall on the Iraqis. This, and the awful possibility of having to go back there one day not so far in the future, should be squarely placed on the heads of those in the Obama administration that wilfully chose this outcome.

sooper kewl - but...

It's one of my favorite harps on people in "Western" governments, how things clandestine ...supposedly only to be known by people in government responsible for things clandestine... have a bad habit of showing up in distinctly not-clandestine places like the newspapers.

Oh, sometimes it is just that the activity wasn't really that secret... or just a little bit so... see the latest Wikileaks troublemaking for one example, or note that folks in the U.S. DeptState are often too willing to say things to blow their own horns... but the worst ones are usually from insiders with political or media agendas acting as "off-the-record" sources. Here's an excerpt from Greyhawk at Mudville Gazette in a recent well-presented article on the Libya Intervention:

That news prompted more squawking about "al Qaeda members among the rebels" - but in the meantime other reporters asked the real question that that response made obvious, but that so many missed: Wait, we have intel guys on the ground? Again, the best answer would have been a simple explanation of some of the many reasons why turning enemies into allies is a good idea, instead we got (shhhh... off the record, of course - and not in these words) "oh stop worrying - this has been a CIA op from the get-go. The boss authorized it before the first bomb fell." (Um, shhhh... that sounds totally sooper kewl - but saying it was a really a super bad idea.)

Bold by me, author comments in parentheses in the original.

There are a host of reasons why much of the inner workings of diplomacy and espionage intelligence activities are generally not topics of conversation, even in peacetime... even between 'friends'... in a time of conflict you can multiply those reasons by a couple orders of magnitude. But, of all that, one thing stands out:

When those things about what "we" are doing get out in public, it paints a target on the people "we" are working with... and sometimes on our operatives as well.

Word gets around about that, pretty quick.

Not many folks remain willing to help our side when doing so borders on the suicidal.

So... please...

those of you in the Trade: Keep secrets secret. That means not only not running your mouth to people outside the operation, but also not violating compartmentalization by leaving bits of operational details in low-security locations.

those of you in the Media: Show at least a little sense about what you publish. Save it up; it'll make a heck of a book you can be famous for writing *after the operation is long over*.

There's a reason for the old admonishment about "not until after 5 and 10"... to not even consider discussing an operation until one has been separated from the Trade for at least 5 years and that the operation have been over for at least 10 years. The bad guys out there have long memories, you see.

Lives, our friend's lives, our people in the field's lives, depend on it.

Freedom for ... a lot of places.

You are probably watching / reading about the Libya Intervention, and you've likely got the sense that all these Tunisia-Egypt-(a lot of places) Uprisings might just be connected... you'd be right, with the exception of Bahrain which appears to be as much external destabilization as a genuine rising.

Here are two more places to watch, one old news and one very very new on the scene:

Yemen: The uprising there has been fueled as much by the new mood as by the old issues of the North-South divide. The tide is running solidly against the regime now, with even ranking military officers (and co-tribalists of President Saleh) going over to the insurrection. Saleh himself seems to be just trying to get favorable terms under which to leave... another good student of the great Arab Nationalists, he. No need to stick around for the lamppost party after the change in management comes...

Syria: The threat to the Assad regime started slowly this time, and was met with the usual crackdowns and arrests, but... it is still growing. More telling, neither of the traditional opponent groups to the regime are in the picture. The splits are tribal, sectarian, and pragmatic now. (Driving Syria's Druze community into opposition was a particularly clumsy move by the regime.) If that means a significant portion of the State Security apparatus is now at risk of falling in with the rising, then there is a chance that al-Hurra (Arabic: the condition of being free; specifically the opposite of enslaved) may come to Syria.

If only...

May this wind continue to blow, and that even far Iran feels it.

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Web Sources Reminder:

Besides the major and local media, which may be beyond your ability to judge for veracity (or to read!), here are a couple analysts and a source for in-region media reports that I recommend without reservation:

Your best source for analysis and understanding of matters Yemeni: Jane Novak at Armies of Liberation.

A very good and informed source for the same on Iran and Middle Eastern matters, although of a well-intended bias (that I agree with): Michael Ledeen at Faster, Please! on Pajamas Media.

Original Source Material can also be found in great abundance and translated reliably at MEMRI, the Middle East Media Research Institute. (link is to their 'blog. Homepage has original source video and more.)

Egypt: Second Tuesday (Updated)

Here's where things are as of now (expect updates on this later):

The mass protests have formed, and they are indeed massive. Cairo protest may be in the hundreds of thousands; Alexandria and Suez are reporting thousands; other demonstrations are reported in the smaller cities and Upper Egypt.

Yesterday's Egypt Update here had news of Frank G. Wisner Jr. getting the call to act as a "representative" for the Obama administration. Just for fairness sake, here is FP's Josh Rogin's take on the choice: "...too close to Mubarak?".

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Related item: It may be that an effort to forestall the growth of protests that have started in Jordan is underway. King Abdullah of Jordan has dismissed his cabinet and appointed a new prime minister amid large street protests. Luck on that. Having Jordan go up at the same time as Egypt, and yet no one in Syria thinking to burn down the House of Assad, is either an ugly coincidence or the best managed Islamist plot in decades. If the protests do continue to spread (Yemen doesn't count; the South hates the Northern government 24/7, they don't need inspiration) we'll have a clue, though. A spread to Syria would plausibly be a self-generated movement; A spread to Saudi Arabia would more likely be something orchestrated (and very short lived, in my opinion. The House of Saud does not tolerate disturbances.) A spread to Libya would be... well, who cares why?... great.

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Update, end of day Tuesday, 'blog time:

Mubarak spoke to his media outlets... said a lot of what would be expected... about the only thing worth taking seriously is the 'promise' not to run as a candidate in the election coming this September and to step down from office after that election.

Note to Kyoudou (Kyodo wire service; Japan) and their AP partners: Getting the story WRONG doesn't help. Mubarak said he IS NOT running again.

Then... there is this. I have no reason to disbelieve Clarice Feldman, nor her now-attributed correspondent, but since the letter is one of opinion there isn't much to trace for authenticity. What I can say is, based on other sources, much of what is said about protest sizes, orchestration, police roles and the sense of how this is being a bit gamed all seem to be true or closely authentic opinion.

So we watch, we wait, and might I suggest keeping a deep suspicion of anyone who claims to be a "leader" of all this... political, regime, or opposition. I'm not sure there is a real leader. In fact, I'd like it better by far if there wasn't.

But there might be one. Look very carefully.

Hariri Tribunal issues a sealed indictment

The Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL; a.k.a. 'The Hariri Tribunal') investigators have finally made their official indictments.

International prosecutors have issued an indictment for the 2005 murder of former Prime Minister Rafik Hariri.

The UN-backed Special Tribunal for Lebanon has not yet released names of suspects, and a pre-trial judge will now decide whether to issue warrants.

Members of the armed Shia group Hezbollah are expected to be named.

Any bets on how long the secret stays secret? Just asking...

Anyway, the political maneuvers to frame this matter have been underway since Hizb'allah (Hezbollah) walked out of the governing coalition last week. They are hoping to get a compliant administration to refuse further cooperation with the STL. Kind of like gangsters trying to buy off a prosecution, that.

In a pleasant manifestation of stated international support for stability as a new Prime Minister is being selected, the U.S. Embassy has been trying to have some understanding (or small support) of the process. Let's just say the guys on the other side are taking notice:

At the weekend, US ambassador Maura Connelly held talks with Christian MP Nicolas Fattoush - seen as a pivotal figure in the attempt to build a new coalition.

Foreign Minister Ali al-Shami summoned the envoy and accused her of "interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon".

The US strenuously denied the allegations, state department spokesman Philip Crowley telling AFP news agency: "We are respecting Lebanon's sovereignty and we would hope other countries would as well."

Don't worry too much; Ambassador Connelly and the staff there must well know that A. al-Shami is only in that job because his Harakat Amal (Amal Movement) party is hand-in-glove (for now) with the Hizb'allah political wing. Best to simply receive the accusation and just smile quietly. Let Foggy Bottom handle the denials duty. Gives Crowley something to do with his spare time.

The big issue in this, of course, is what will Hizb'allah do if they think a government supported by Saudi Arabia, France, and or the United States is going to come into power. Unless it will be a terribly weak coalition, one with those supporters is not going to back off the quest to punish Hariri (Sr.) 's assassins. That will leave Hizb'allah only with its lifeline allies of Iran, Syria and anyone playing for their team, then Amal and the turncoat faction led by Michel Aoun siding with it in-country.

That isn't a sit-pat hand in the allies department, and there isn't much other than offering safe exile that they could do if they wait until the STL makes the charges formal and public. The expected play will be to continue to short-circuit the process: If bringing down the administration won't stop things, then the next step is probably either a move to *make* Hizb'allah the government (a coup or civil war) or the threat of a external conflict of sufficient size to distract attention (gee, another Hizb-Israeli War might do). But I'm not sure that latter choice would work. The Saudis for one would happily fight Hizb'allah to the last Israeli, if you get my meaning, and such a conflict going regional would simply end any sense in the Gulf Cooperation Council that the Iranian regime could be tolerated any longer.

Avoiding that and getting the accused to trial may be mutually exclusive.

I *think* it would be worth it, though, especially if those still-sealed indictments reach out beyond Hizb'allah... maybe even outside Lebanon...

Black August?

The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan has always had an uncomfortable relationship with the common population of the Jordan River region. Being a foreign line of nobility that was placed atop one part of the partition of the former Ottoman Empire after World War I, and being functionally exiled from Peninsular Arabia by their rivals the House of Saud, it is no wonder that domestic politics in Jordan are still based as much on the fears of insecure rulers as anything else.

How insecure? How about the fact that over 70% of the population of Jordan self-identifies as "Palestinian"? How about the uncomfortable historical fact that the land itself has been promised, and claimed, thrice over in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman overlords? (Syria certainly hasn't forgotten that, and has acted upon their claim in the recent enough past.) How about the fact that the last time the Palestine Liberation Organization tried to take over the country (in 1970), the result was a war *inside Jordan*... General Information Only, but to explain the full horror of that: Black September.

So when rumors get going, the conspiracy theories circulate, and when those rumors are that Israel is supposedly going to evict all the Palestinians from the West Bank area... panic ensues in the highest reaches of the Jordanian government.

(Israeli) Defense officials said this week that despite Israeli assurances that the Netanyahu government was not planning on evicting Palestinians to Jordan, Amman's anxiety was still high, likely an indication that "the Jordanians are still concerned that Israel is considering Jordan as an alternative for a Palestinian state," one official said. "The visit was aimed at assuaging those fears and ensuring that strategic relations between the countries stay on track."

Reasonable fear, though. The original division of the region into the Palestine Mandate and the Trans-Jordan was in part an intentional effort by the British to make Trans-Jordan (now the Kingdom of Jordan) an Arab-ruled Palestinian nation. No organized forcible relocations happened until the British were out of the picture though (but a lot happened from 1948 on... mostly exiling the Jewish residents of the Arab-ruled states surrounding Israel. There were removals of Palestinians from land in the Mandate as well, and then the massive self-exile of the Arab population from the Mandate at the time of Israeli Independence).

Well, here we go again:

Alarmed by rumors regarding a US-backed scheme to turn Jordan into a homeland for Palestinians, Abdullah is planning a series of steps to foil any attempt to resettle Palestinian refugees in the kingdom.

The rumors were triggered by talks about a plan to establish a decentralized government in Jordan, where local communities would enjoy some form of autonomy.

The Jordanian authorities' decision to revoke the citizenship of Palestinians in Jordan - who make up more than 70 percent of the kingdom's population - added fuel to the fire by giving substance to the rumors.

Not the best move, that. Let's hope it wasn't a fatal mistake.

The Test; UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee -- part 1

This author has called the Japanese role as Chairman of the UNSC Iran Sanctions Committee "a test", and it is in fact testing time for all parties now:

Iran and Syria have until next week to explain to a United Nations sanctions committee how they were involved with a ship detained off Cyprus in January found to be loaded with explosives believed to be bound for Gaza.

What makes this a particular challenge is that the UNSC Presidency itself is not exactly in sympathetic hands right now... Libya has it for the month.

The Man is Well Understood

A strong contender for quote of the day comes from Lebanon's Samir Geagea regarding the recent scheming by political-turncoat Michel Aoun and the Syrians:

In answering a question about status of Christians after the visit to Syria by Free Patriotic Movement leader Michel Aoun, Geagea said:

"In light of past experiences of the late Kamal Jumblat, Suleiman Franjeih and Rafik Hariri, I'm not worried about the Christians, but I am worried about Aoun."

Might be wanting to add one J. Carter to the "be worried about" list, after M. Aoun's name. He is wandering around the neighborhood doing his self-important dance again.

IAEA and the Syrian Reactor strike

This just in:

The chief U.N. nuclear inspector says his agency is taking allegations that Syria has a hidden atomic program very seriously.

No Uranium found. Yes Uranium found. Then again, it wouldn't have been fueled at the time of the strike.

Found any graphite yet, Chief? Estimates are that there were over a hundred TONS of graphite in the supposed design...

Hunter-Killer raid inside Syria

This is simply an advisory to readers regarding the reports of a Hunter-Killer raid (sometimes called Task Force 88 raid) having been conducted inside Syria.

The following sources have parts of the story:

Bill Roggio at Long War Journal has a lead story and a very good follow up.

Lebanese news source Ya Libnan has reports of what Syrian media is reporting.

Reuters Alertnet quotes the BBC as to Syria's diplomatic response

Might explain the undocumented passengers...

...on those flights that are running direct from Caracas to Damascus, and then on straight to Tehran.

This matter is one I've been dogging for a while for a number of reasons, but when an otherwise unrelated announcement came out in Israel yesterday, first on Channel 2 TV and then in Haaretz newspaper, it caught my attention.

The story is now being second-sourced by AFP, via the Middle East Times, reporting that multiple Israeli newspapers are carrying versions of this story. *Here* is their version.

Now I've been burned before by partisan Israeli sources (yes, DEBKAfile, I'm looking at you) but this case seems clear enough: The GovIsrael has had a Travel Warning out for a month warning "its citizens living and travelling abroad to take extra precautions against possible Hezbollah attacks or abductions."

In charge of "sensitive files", eh?

Here's a compare-and-contrast about an item on the wires right now:

Reuters runs this story as this:

http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSL38377420080803


but Ya Libnan runs it with *a little more* insight:

http://yalibnan.com/site/archives/2008/08/assads_liaison.php

Key Points:

The officer in question was Syria's ranking military liaison with Lebanese Hezbollah. Reuters chose to leave out that little detail.