note: 1st Battalion, 8th Marines was then the ground component of 24th MAU.
Now it is not my habit, nor my pleasure to call into question the conduct of a U.S. Marine officer, but I feel the need to do so this time. NPR says:
Geraghty has often wondered if there were ways the U.S. military could have reduced or prevented the losses in 1983. "The original size magnitude of that device was considered to be stoppable. It wasn't," he says.
"Forensics done afterward by FBI and others [show] that this was the largest nonnuclear explosion on record," he adds. "It guaranteed mass casualties. There was no way we could have stopped that bomb in that environment."
Geraghty blames the vulnerable location of the base: "We were in the middle of an active international airport and really didn't have control of the people and vehicles entering and exiting.
"From the first day there, I was uneasy with that location. It was selected for diplomatic and political reasons a year earlier. [It was] a static location surrounded by hills with over 600 tubes of artillery [that] could be brought to bear on us."
He says that tactically, it was "an abominable position."
Sir, other than the entirely irrelevant statement about the number of tubes of arty looking down on you, what you are quoted as saying is an unmitigated misrepresentation.
The largest non-nuclear explosions in history (see references there cited) yield between 2 and 4 thousand tons of HE.
The bomb that hit your men was about 5 tons yield.
Your men got hit with one damn truckload.
A truck that proper perimeter and alertness could have stopped but for ROE and standing orders that prevented the guards from engaging.
This happened six months after a vehicle bomb had blasted the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, so the idea sure wasn't new to you.
Your wire fence wasn't even improved with improvised spikes to impede crashthroughs, you had no meaningful barriers around the building and your men posted as guards were not ordered to carry ready weapons.
You, Sir, may have done everything you could for your men after the bombing, but you have no, repeat no excuse for what you were responsible for before the bombing.
Telling outright falsehoods about what happened isn't exactly to your credit either.
Do you think the men don't know the truth?
The 25th Anniversary survivor's re-union is this week.
A retraction is in order, or I suggest you don't bother to show up.
***
Addenda, 19.Oct2008 -- Please see the comments for details
The issues in question are those of "impossibility" and of the motivation of publishing the claim of "impossibility".
The call made here is that Col. Geraghty make a correction to the quotations of his interview claiming the size and effect of the bomb, and make a retraction as to the implied assertion that *preventing* the total destruction of the building housing the Battalion Landing Team was "impossible".
A call is now made upon NPR to amend or annotate their report, and to retract their claim as to "impossibility" as extant investigations clearly refute that.
There is reason to believe that NPR initiated the interview, so questions of motivation fall upon them, *perhaps moreso*, to answer as well.
15 comments:
As a former member of the 24th Marine Amphibious Unit, who served under Colonel Tim Geraghty, I feel compelled to respond to your posting. I disagree, in the strongest terms. with not only your assessment of the man himself but also with your grasp of the facts. A 500 word summary from an NPR interview, in no way contains enough information to justify the questioning of a man's motivation, truthfulness or depth of his character.
Col. Geraghty is spot on in his evaluation of the positions, chosen for his Marines and Sailors to man. The terrain was not suitable for an adequate defense and in fact was not chosen for its tactical value, but rather its political value. For some reason, that I still don't fully appreciate, the U.S. State Department found it absolutely crucial that the Beirut International Airport (BIA) remain open. It was therefor decided over the objections of the Secretary of Defense himself, that the Marines would be placed there.
Your belief that Geraghty's statement regarding the existence of 600 tubes (ie.artillery and rocket positions) aimed at the Marines as being "irrelevant", is absolutely mind boggling to me. They WERE relevant to me! That was especially true after we began losing Marines to fire from those tubes. If God forbid, in the future, you ever find yourself under fire, you will fully understand the folly of that statement.
Throughout the deployment, Col Geraghty sought to have the MAU either redeployed to more suitable positions or removed to our amphibious shipping offshore. He was turned down at every request. His command summaries and other communications can be read at www.MCU.usmc.mil/MCRweb?Archive/Beirut/index.html.
He also protested, in the strongest terms, the shore bombardment of Druze and Syrian positions at Suq al Gharb that had been engaged in fierce fighting with the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). I personally heard Geraghty tell the president's representative that "We're the ones who are going to pay the price." Our siding with the LAF lead directly into what is now known as the "September War". Once seen by the warring factions as just another player in the Civil War, we were under constant fire during that month.
Because of the artillery and rocket fire the MAU received, a decision was made to bring as many Marines as practical into hardened structures rather that leave them with nothing more than the minimal protection of sandbags and canvas. The BLT Headquarters Building was the largest and strongest structure in the MAU area of responsibility.
You seem to place a great deal of weight on the fact that the bombing of the Marine Barracks was not the largest non-nuclear blast on record. You are correct, it was not. However, I think you might reassess Col Geraghty's statement to NPR if you knew that the original claim that it was the largest, was based on statements made by the FBI forensic team. Their statements were picked up by many network news agencies as well as national newspapers. I personally have read the claim in the USA Today, The Navy Times and several other newspapers. Col Geraghty was simply repeating the information as it had been provided to him.
The ROE, also appears to form another bulwark in your opinion. Col Geraghty, nor any other Marine commander on the ground was responsible for the establishment of Rules of Engagement. The ROE was established by a much higher command after negotiations with our MNF allies, (UK,France, Italy) and the Lebanese Government. This is not to say that the commander on the ground could not make adjustments to the ROE, however those adjustments had to eventually receive approval from higher authority. In fact, Geraghty and BLT 1/8 Commander LtCol Howard L. Gerlach were later criticized by the Long Commission for making adjustments to the ROE without authorization.
Not all of the Marine sentries, manning posts were prohibited from having magazines in their weapons. Those positions immediately adjacent to the BIA terminal kept their weapons unloaded with magazines at the ready, because there was a fear that civilians utilizing the terminal would be endangered if there happened to be an accidental discharge (AD) of a round or rounds from those posts. AD's from Marine positions had wounded Lebanese soldiers earlier in the deployment.
Secondly, the entryway into BIA was controlled by LAF checkpoints. The route into the area, from which the truck bomber attacked the BLT, could only be accessed through those LAF checkpoints.
When Col Geraghty stated that it was impossible to have stopped the truck bomber, I believe that he is referring to an FBI study that concluded that the truck bomb, laden with PETN, gas enhanced with compressed cylinders of acetylene and propane, could have detonated with 400 meters of the BLT HQ Building and still have had enough power to collapse the building and causing mass casualties.
The truck bomb did not have to actually enter our compound to collapse the building. By the time the truck bomb would have entered an area where sentries would have been authorized to take it under fire, the vehicle would have been inside the 400 meter arc. Had the sentries been able to kill or wound the driver, subsequent FBI investigation has shown that the truck bomb was equipped with a "dead man's switch". The bomb would have gone off no matter what actions the sentries took.
You might also check your numbers on bomb's yield. Information I've seen estimates the yield to be the explosive equivalent to 12,000 to 15,000 pounds of TNT. That's six to seven and one half tons. No matter what the numbers turn out to be, believe me, it was more than enough to accomplish their mission.
Finally, it is now known that just outside the Marine perimeter, under the direction of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard, the infamous terrorist group Hezbollah was being formed. A communication from Iranian authorities to their Ambassador to Syrian, was intercepted. It authorized Hezbollah to "spectacularly" attack the Marines in Beirut. This information was never forwarded to Col Geraghty. I'm confident that had Col Geraghty known of the existence and content of that communication, we would never be attending the 25th Remembrance next week.
I'll be attending that Remembrance the year. I'm looking forward to seeing Col Geraghty again. Although I've spoken to him on the telephone, I've not seen him in person since 1983.
Your statement, "Do you think your men don't know the truth?", is the most factual representation you made. We DO know the truth. I can assure you that he is our brother Marine and that those of us who were privileged to have served with him, hold him in the highest esteem.
Glenn E. Dolphin
"24 MAU 1983, A Marine Looks Back on the Peacekeeping Mission to Beirut, Lebanon"
@glenn
First of all, a welcome to you. I commend a response, especially from a recently published memoirist on the subject at the heart of this posting.
Let me see if I can offer a bit of both acceptance and refutation of yours, by terms.
- "A 500 word summary..."
In principle I concur, with the exception of truthfulness as it applies to mistatements or misquotations. There is a full recording of the interview available as well. The question of motivation is one of timing (coming just before the 25th anniversary). His depth of character, or any character issue beyond the two cited, is not at issue.
- "...his evaluation of the positions..."
The ground he was given was certainly operationally indefensible, and it was not his choice. That is also not germaine to the specific issue of ingress security as applies to a vehicle-borne attacker.
- "...600 tubes..."
They were absolutely of relevence in the greater sense of the operation and the preservation of the security and safety of 24MAU. They were of no relevence to the ability of a vehicle-borne weapon to strike at the base.
(personal note: I've been worked over, thank you.)
- "...redeployment..."
*That* is a very good point, and one I made no mention of. Thank you for pointing it out.
- in regard to the decision to concentrate in the building.
If you are arguing that the artillery fire received justified better force protection, I am with you all the way. If you are arguing that the building used was in any meaningful way hardened, I disagree.
- citations on the size of the explosive
A mistaken claim gains no truth by repetition. Moreover, larger sapper mines are commonly documented (those of WWI are famously pictured). What it may well have been was the largest vehicle bomb of its time. Your recall of analysis rating the bomb at roughly 12,000 lbs TNT eq. is consistant with my ~5 tons (5300 kg or so). I'll mention more about composition, below.
- the ROE and who sets it
(personal note: I would caution once again about preaching to the choir, padre)
I'll concede that one could read what I wrote to infer that the ROE limitations that were to Col. Geraghty's blame. They certainly were not, and yes there is record of him contesting the specifics of the ROE. Standing Orders were within his command responsibility, and you correctly identify the Long Commission report as the authoritative investigation as to the choices made.
- composition of the device and blast effects.
Let's just say that PETN (and RDX's) and fuel-enhanced explosives are rather within my field of understanding, and that while a yield in excess of 5 tons TNT eq. is certainly devastating to personel in the open at 400 meters and would have had serious effect upon the facade rooms of the building, it was the penetration to the very building itself, with its particulars of design, by which the bomb caused the massive structural collapse. My personal *estimate* says that a dead-man detonation at 100 meters setback would have been devastating, but not a total collapse (which was the major cause of fatalities).
I'd be open to seeing the 'FBI study', if you happen to have a citation on that.
- "Finally ... This information was never forwarded to Col Geraghty."
I will confess utter astonishment, *unless* you are speaking of the precise intercept being forwarded. The general situation and the Pasdaran (IRGC) involvement in the organization that would be Hizballah were well disseminated. After the Embassy bombing, the methodology was also not unheard of.
- To your conclusions
I am not on personal terms with Col. Geraghty, so I take your testimony on his character as fact. I'm even willing to take the risk that he would understand that difficult things can be asked about the way his statements are being represented.
I called for a retraction. To be more particular, I call for a retraction of the quotations about the size of the bomb and the impossiblity of countermeasures.
I still call for a retraction on those points either from Col. Geraghty or if he has claim, from NPR's interviewer.
Had the statement been:
'We did almost everything we could within the situation, and even broke some rules, and still couldn't stop the bombing.'
...I would have no challenge, and I would even applaud Col. Geraghty for saying so on the memorial of the attack.
Or to paraphrase your words, I might have said "...that those who were privileged to have served with him still hold him in the highest esteem." because obviously you still do.
Please convey my request to Col. Geraghty when you speak to him, not for me, but to see the NPR interview made right.
@All
It occurred to me that many of you reading the discussion between Glenn Dolphin and myself, above, might not have the slightest idea what the "Long Commission" was, or what it reported.
The U.S. Department of Defense inquiry into the events of the Marine Barracks Bombing was chaired by retired Adm. Robert L. J. Long (ret.) and the report was issued in both summary and in full.
Here they are:
Brian Michael Jenkins of RAND, testimony before the Long Commission.
The Appendix to that posting gives the Summary of the Commission Report.
Archival transcription of the full Report
Please note both make reference in detail to matters of bomb size, physical security, the Rules of Engagement and their implementation.
Mr. Garrett,
Thank you for the response. It's nice to have a discussion where the two participants are not ranting at each other, as now seems to be the custom of our culture.
- 500 Word Summary -
Two points:
1. Maybe this is just semantics but in my opinion, the questions of a man's "veracity" (adherence to the truth) IS a questioning of his character.
2. You may be reading too much into the timing of Geraghty's remarks with the 25th Anniversary. Aside from his testimony to the Long Commission, Col Geraghty has remained largely silent despite constant requests from his Marines and Sailors that he tell what we regard as OUR story. He has always responded that he was reticent to do so out of respect for the families of Marines, Sailors and Soldiers we lost. In recent years, many of those family members have joined the chorus of folks asking for Geraghty to set the record straight. I hope he takes that opportunity.
Since I wrote my book, I've learned a few things (that I probably should have already known) about how the media operates. Whenever, an anniversary of a famous or infamous event occurs, some reporter will conduct a Lexus-Nexus search that produces the names of people who might have information useful to their news story. In the case of the Marine Barracks Bombing, within minutes of that data search, I or my publisher get a telephone call from a reporter. I can only imagine that the numbers of reporters trying to contact Geraghty is exponentially larger than those attempting to contact me.
"his evaluations of the positions"
I failed to mention this in my original post. There was a four to six lane highway connecting BIA to Beirut. It's northbound lanes were almost always packed with traffic. The only thing that separated those lanes from the western side of the BLT Building was a wrought iron fence and 25-30 meters. If fact many of the close-up camera shots produced by the news media, after the bombing were taken from that road.
There were Marine guard posts constructed there, but the reaction time, had a terrorist with vehicle-born device decided to crash through that fence, would have been less than those of the sentries at Post #7 on 10/23/83. I know that both Geraghty and Gerlach were extremely concerned about that vulnerability. I'm sure it figured heavily in their request to reposition the MAU.
The infamous "Cafe Danielle" from which Marine Infantry Companies received so much fire (ie.. small arms, rpg's, recoilless et al) was no more than 100 meters distant from our positions. A bomb of equivalent yield to the 10/23/83 device could have virtually wiped out a Marine Company, with there being little defense against it.
My point being, that Col Geraghty's ability to limit or effect the vehicle ingress through and near his positions was extremely limited.
600 Tubes
I believe I've made my point concerning vehicle ingress in the above paragraph. However, I think the 600 tubes issue is valid in this way. I think its natural for a commander to focus his energies in dealing with the threat that is killing his men at that very moment. From July to 10/23/83, that threat was coming from those 600 tubes. While we were digging in, dealing with fire from militiamen and private armies, the IGRC and Hezbollah had the luxury of evaluating our vulnerabilities, while in no way being hindered or effected by threats to their own safety. That was a luxury Marine commanders did not enjoy.
"Redeployment"
You are correct the BLT building would, under normal situations not be considered a hardened structure. But I think you'll have to agree that everything is relative. When you are under fire, concrete and rebar beat the heck out of sand and canvas. It should also be noted, there were at least four other buildings we used to quarter Marines. Since the BLT was the only one attacked, the others go largely unnoticed.
"Citations on the size of the explosive"
I don't really see the relevance as to whether the 10/23/83, bomb was the first or tenth largest non-nuclear device. Yes Geraghty cited it as such, but in my mind, the incorrectness of that statement, warrants a correction and nothing more.
"ROE"
I think we're in agreement on the facts here.
"Composition of the device and blast effects"
I'm one PHD short of understanding the dynamics of how to determine the strengths and capabilities of what a yield in excess of 5 tons, at distance are. My personal experience tells me not to underestimate the destructive force of that shock wave.
I've seen the FBI study published before. I specifically recall it cited in a Navy Times article that was published circa 1985. Much of the study is also mentioned, almost verbatim, in the Long Commission's report. More specifically, within the last two years, the Military Channel aired a documentary series, I believe entitled "Investigating History". Beirut Veterans of America founder Maj. Bob Jordan participated in the documentary. The FBI study was used as a reference throughout the program.
"This information was never forwarded to Col Geraghty"
Your term Utter astonishment is spot on. This information became available, not during the Long Commission but rather during testimony conducted in the law suit of Beirut survivors and their families against Iran. In testimony, Admiral James A. Lyons, a Deputy Chief of Naval Operations stated that on 9/26/83, the message from the Iranian MOIS to their Ambassador to Syria, Ali Akbar Mohtashemi was intercepted by U.S. Naval Intelligence. Neither the existence nor the content of the intercept was ever relayed to Geraghty. I find it unbelievable that this evidence was never cited in the Long Commission's Report. I wonder if they were ever informed of the intercept's existence.
Conclusions
You are of course entitled to stand by your conclusions as do I my own.
I think my opinions are best summarized by the writer Eric Hammel who has written extensively about the bombing. In 1993, he wrote an article for Proceedings Magazine. He maintained that his review of the records indicated that Geraghty requested on several occasions to be granted the authority to back load his MAU onto amphibious shipping. He was denied. He also, on several occasions, requested to be allowed to harden his positions. He again was denied. If a commander is forced into a position where he can't leave and he can't adequately defend, a disaster is surely in the making. The facts show it was.
Thanks again for providing a platform for an interesting and thoughtful discussion.
sincerely,
Glenn Dolphin
@glenn
Thank you, Mr. Dolphin, for your excellent contribution. You've brought many details to readers here that while familiar to me are likely their first exposure to how difficult a situation 24MAU was placed in. I expecially compliment you on providing a detail (two actually) that I was not familar with.
On examination, I will assert that the matter of "impossibility" is the only open issue, and one we chose to disagree on with cause.
Had the attack occured as it did, but with a detonation in the approaches (rather than directly in the structure), some number of casualties would still have resulted. Our difference of opinion is one of scale, albeit some orders of scale, and whether it was possible or not to have taken action that would have so mitigated the casualties.
I shall see to an addition to the article at the top of this thread making clear my specific call. I shall place the claim of "motivation" upon the NPR interviewer where it rightly belongs, as well.
Thank you again, and I hope you consider you opinions welcome here upon any of the topic discussions you wish to join.
9:23p.m. typo:
last line "you opinions" should be "your opinions"
The cited source of the claim of greater blast effect, and that a detonation at the airport road would still have destroyed the building is
...a briefing by FBI Special Agent Danny Deffenbaugh...
Sp.Agent Deffenbaugh is noted in public record as having been at the Dallas office as of 2001, but no public copy of his briefing is readily available.
If anyone has a copy of that analysis, please inform me here. Thank you.
wow---
do I have some reading to do--
Hi Glenn!
A mis-statement left uncorrected gets repeated as fact:
Claude Salhani at Middle East Times quotes the Proceeding / NPR Interview regarding the size of the attack.
((sigh))
Wow-- what a discussion here! Glenn E. Dolphin has quite a background as I did an internet search-- and what a story--
Glenn Dolphin
This really gives a visual about what happened that day--
Mr. Dolphin--
You are a true hero! And I am glad you are here to have been able to tell your story-- as I read the article from the Charleston Gazette- today's-
I just read the article again from the Charleston Gazette-- How so sad!! beyond words here-- My prayers extend to all but especially to Don Hildreth--
I am going to buy his book-- I just read a great review and Mr. Dolphin's account on why and how he wrote the book-
As for the 600 tubes talk here-- I have no idea-- but it does sound like Col. Geraghty did what he could do at the time- but given the fact, I have never been exposed to any kind of war or I have never been in the military, some of this is hard for me to understand-- but Mr. Dolphin's story made me understand and realize AGAIN how ugly war is.
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