Having had a little time to digest what happened in the terrorist strike against Mumbai (Bombay), India, there are a host of small observations that can be made about the “how”, if not the “why” of the attack. The piece-part elements included a sufficiently competent attack force capable of quality infantry individual combat, reliable enough automatic firearms for each attacker with a large supply of additional ammunition, explosives of both the emplace-able and hand grenade types, and a full suite of commercially available aids to transportation, navigation and communication. The attackers also had enough endurance aids, both of the food and pharmaceutical kinds, to prolong their combat ability. That last capability has to be taken in terms of application, however, as the Mumbai attackers were a “suicide-squad”. Plans of that sort have the simplicity of not needing an exfiltration concept, so all endurance aids can be focused on increasing the opportunities of the attackers to cause further destruction rather than on getting them away after their raid. But what if there had been a convenient hinterland (or border) to escape to?
After all, not every group intent on spreading terror and destabilizing the state they are “at war” with has the sort of motivation and basis that would allow for a regular supply of high-quality recruits who are also fanatics intent on voluntary suicide. It only takes a look at the various Communist-inspired terror raiders of the 1970’s who shot up airports and other public places to point out the shortage of fight-to-the-death types amongst the competent combatants available. Those raids depended (in concept at least) on either timing, specifically a moment of carnage and then a quick escape attempt, or hostage-taking to shield the escape. In much of the developed world, that lesson has now been learned and the capability of State Actors (Law-Enforcement, Intelligence and Military) are far more capable of responding to such events in a way that escape is far less likely than in decades before. Even if the attackers do momentarily escape, pursuit is more capable and far more likely to gain cooperation from other Nations than ever before. Again, though, what if there was a combination of sympathy and social dysfunction in the place the attackers escaped to that normal pursuit would be delayed if not impractical?
If that was indeed the situation available to a potential attacker, then much of the burden of recruiting raiders is greatly lifted. The organizing group need only have a plausible plan for getting their terrorists away from the scene of the attack and the promise of shelter, aid, and if need be disappearance (identity-wise) to increase the pool of potential terrorists to include that which is in far wider supply: the amoral killer.
There should be plenty of those around, one might think, and if all one needed were gangster thugs to do the job well then they are available in disquietingly large numbers. The limit on that supply would be the cost (loyal thugs are a prized commodity, after all) and the need from the stated premise above that they be competent combatants. If paying for thugs is costly to gangster organizations, then paying for more than a couple of highly qualified military-trained killers is beyond the budget of most common organized crime groups. It takes a particularly lucrative and by-nature violent criminal enterprise to require any significant number of such killers and to operate them in tactical groups.
One alternative, and one commonly discussed when looking at Middle Eastern terrorism, is the State-sponsored terrorist but for this line of inquiry let us set aside those cases as State-sponsored and Para-state Organizations are so traceable to their sponsors by contemporary Intelligence Agencies that the actions of such terrorists is rightfully considered an act of war. Just ask the Afghani Taliban about what happens after that. But if the group conducting the act of terror is able to have carved out for itself a criminal state-within-a-state, then attributing blame to the Nation they are operating out of is more problematic. If the Government of that Nation is already in open conflict with the terrorists, but incapable of defeating (or even containing) them, then all manner of complexities of National Sovereignty and international legal constraints come into play, mostly to the benefit of the terrorist group.
So to be capable of replicating a Mumbai-style terror raid (to use the most current example) without having fanatic suicide-soldiers, the initial limitations to be overcome are, in no particular order: Motivation; Quality Combatants; Money; An Escape Plan; and then possessing enough modern weapons, ammunition and explosives to do the job. If available, a large available supply of drugs suitable for use to increase combat endurance / effectiveness would be a bonus. If an organization capable of having all those factors in hand also has a suitable urban area as a target, then all the pieces fall into place.
Anyone care to guess who and where that combination of ill-omens is most threatening right now?
Let us add one more hint: Where have *in the last year alone* such terrorist activities resulted in roughly the same number of dead *every three months* as the Mumbai attacks caused?
Have a guess yet?
Some recent Mexican army and police confrontations with drug cartels have taken on the characteristics of small-unit combat, with cartels employing automatic weapons and, on occasion, grenades. Firefights have taken place in many towns and cities across Mexico but particularly in northern Mexico, including Tijuana, Chihuahua City and Ciudad Juarez. The situation in northern Mexico remains fluid; the location and timing of future armed engagements cannot be predicted.If the guess was Mexico, sadly, that is correct. The above quote is from the U.S. Department of State Travel Alert, as currently issued. The situation is multilayered: with Mexican Narco-trafficking Cartels battling each other; the National Government (Law Enforcement and Military) battling the Narco-traffickers; and the Narco-traffickers also engaged in a campaign of terror against the very structure of the society.
There has been another of the ongoing rounds of violence just this weekend, with shootouts in Guerrero and Cuidad Juarez.
Torture and terrorism against the State and the population is all-too-common.
The Narco-traffickers have targeted journalists for particular attention, and the violence has even engulfed hospitals.
What makes this all far worse than merely gangsterism-grown-large is that the incredibly lucrative profits of narco-trafficking (known transfers in cash exceed US$7 billion a year; total estimates go as high as STRATFOR’s estimate of US$40 billion a year) allow the now consolidated Cartels to afford the very highly trained ex-military personnel that were spoken of previously. The Gulf Cartel, with its sometimes-partner The Tijuana Cartel, acts through its infamous Los Zetas armed force, originally composed of renegade former GAFE Special Forces soldiers. The Sinaloa Cartel, The Federation, and those fragments of the Juarez Cartel loyal to The Sinaloa Cartel act through their Los Negros force (an attempt to copy Los Zetas). Each side’s armed force has hundreds of reliable soldiers.
Both forces are also armed to the teeth. One recent success on the part of the Mexican Federal Forces resulted in the seizure of 540 rifles, 165 grenades, 14 blocks of TNT and half a million rounds of ammunition.
Even when there are successes by the Mexican authorities, just getting a high-value suspect into safe custody is an exercise in overcoming armed resistance every step of the way.
And that is what leads to the nightmare scenario… a Mexican Mumbai, or a cross-border raid against an American urban area in reprisal for arrests or extradition of Cartel members.
This month, the first tranche of the Merida Initiative funding by the U.S.A. for the direct supply of equipment for Mexican forces has been released. This will deliver much-needed aircraft, communications and protective gear, and equipment for information analysis to the beleaguered Mexican authorities. All well and good.
Now how about making sure that *the north side of that border* have sufficient assets available to intervene the next time trouble spills across?
Because it might not just be a kidnapping next time; It might well be a Drive-in version of the attack on Mumbai.
***
End Notes:
Most all end notes are embedded as links in the text.
One additional (and superb) resource not commonly known of is the Council forum on Small Wars Journal. This link is to an ongoing discussion on this particular topic. Obviously, there are many other topics elsewhere in the forum.
General Information links from Wiki-p. The usual caveat applies: Check all sources.
Cartel del Golfo, The Gulf Cartel. A major Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization.
Los Zetas. This is the specialized armed force of the Gulf Cartel; it has several branches.
Cartel del Sinaloa, The Sinaloa Cartel. A major Mexican Drug Trafficking Organization.
Los Negros. This is the specialized armed force of the Sinaloa Cartel.
The Merida Initiative. This summary is particularly useful for its map references to Cartel activities and Military Counter-Narcotics Efforts.
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