The Weekly N&C for November 24th, 2008

Still a stepping stone

Since the coming of Portuguese adventurers in the 15th Century, the coast of furthest West Africa was considered more valuable as a stepping stone to the treasures of the south than as a holding of any particular value. Unlike the Gulf of Guinea further around the western coastline, the Atlantic shore held little of its own for colonial adventurers to desire. Yes, there was a slave trade that came to be, and that combined with tribal warfare and the spread of foreign diseases grievously depopulated much of the region. If one knew where to look, and could brave the resistance of the exceptionally strong tribal kingdoms of the interior lands, some gold and more than a few gemstones were there to be found, but those remained mostly out of the hands of the Europeans. They quite prudently stayed for the most part near the coast in fortified bases and only when opportunity arose did they trade with the interior kingdoms.

The real value, to the Europeans, was that bases at the extreme of West Africa acted as a stepping stone for transits on to South America, or on toward Southern Africa and the route to India. This was, in the earliest part of the Age of Discovery, most valuable to Portugal who held colonial claim in what would be Brazil as well as the stages of Angola, Mozambique, and on to the heart of the Indian Ocean. *Here is a map reference*, showing various holdings over time of the Portuguese Empire. Upon examination, that reveals the real role of the Portuguese holding at Guinea, and the later European holdings in the same region: In the days of sail, to hold a base there was the key to access to a world-spanning Empire-by-Sea.

Of course, the world no longer depends upon galleons for oceanic trade and the post-1948 world has functionally criminalized Colonialism, so it is fair to ask what matter is it now if all that was the historical significance of the extreme of West Africa…

To which the answers can be made that: (1) Colonialism, or more specifically the manner of de-colonization, created a situation of current importance; and (2) The very geographic relationship between West Africa and Europe that once was essential to the outward Empires is now of equal importance but in a reverse flow.

The de-colonization of the Portuguese Empire did not even really begin until most of the other colonial powers had, either by force or choice, well begun to divest themselves of colonies. The accepted explanation for this is the bull-headed stubbornness of fascist-autocracies in the face of international condemnation, and Portugal was only barely outlasted by F. Franco’s Spain as the last authoritarian regime in Western Europe. In the key years of de-colonization (post-World War II~1970’s), Portugal remained steadfast in its commitment to retain its colonies. Unfortunately for Portugal, the 1950’s and 1960’s were also the heyday of Soviet sponsorship of “Armies of Liberation”, which meant that throughout the African holdings of the Portuguese Empire pretty much any group that sent a couple of fellows off to Glorious People’s Revolutionary High School could then get all the guns and bombs they needed shipped in from the Soviet Union. Places like Angola and Mozambique were (and are) big enough though that arming one group or faction did not guarantee a successful war against the colonials. In those cases, the revolt had to spread to a wide enough number of the local tribes and/or factions to bring down the state. But in then-called Portuguese Guinea, the matter was far more manageable. A riverine jungle-filled territory little bigger than the U.S. State of Maryland, with at the time of de-colonization less than a million people, and with the colonialists virtually restricted to a couple of coastal swaths of territory and a very small number of islands, and with really only one urban area to strive to control, this was nearly an ideal opportunity for an insurgency.

Even given such nearly ideal conditions, the liberation struggle of the Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde (African Party for the Independence of Guinea and Cape Verde; PAIGC) was less than a stunning success. This group formed in 1956 as a political party, and only after joining in with groups based in Angola and Mozambique did they militarize. Acts of warfare started in 1962, and full-scale warfare was declared the next year. Heavily supplied by the Soviet bloc, and facing a Portuguese military that was clearly second-class behind their forces in other colonies, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of the People (FARP) won consistently and took control of most of the mainland of the territory. It was not until 1970 that the Portuguese Army turned the tide, and that was by using all the firepower and brutality available. By the time of the 1973 declaration of independence, the FARP was basically defeated…

Defeated? Declaration of Independence? Well, before cognitive dissonance takes hold, please allow the explanation that “defeat” didn’t mean much when the U. N. General Assembly recognized and admitted the PAIGC government as legitimate *and* most of the leadership of the Portuguese Army that had administered the defeat went back to Portugal and led a (peaceful) Socialist revolution that overthrew the government back home. In the wake of that Carnation Revolution, Portugal renounced with no further conditions almost all of its colonial possessions (Macau in China being the notable exception) and massive disorder and chaos swept through all the now-abandoned territories. In then-called Portuguese Guinea, this meant the slaughter of some thousands of former loyalist Africans. The one-party state that resulted under the PAIGC leader Luis Cabral (brother of the party-founder Amilcar Cabral, who died during the revolutionary struggle at the hands of one of his own) was the Union of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde. This lasted, mostly intact, until a Guinean named João Bernardo Vieira (known as “Nino” during the wars) led a 1980 military coup against the Cabral regime. Being that the Cabrals were Capeverdian, that pretty much put an end to the Union. J. Vieira also seized control of the PAIGC political machinery, and that left him the undisputed leader of Guinea-Bissau.

J. Vieira ruled as head of the Revolutionary Council for four years, then reinstituted a National Popular Assembly and thereafter a new Constitution under which he “won” office as President, head-of-the-party, and commander of the Armed Forces. Which considering he faced coup attempts at least three times in the following 10 years, didn’t seem to buy much in the way of national stability. Considering also that Guinea-Bissau was the poorest and least developed of Portugal’s colonies before independence, it should be no surprise that Guinea-Bissau was (and is) one of the poorest countries in the world.

An attempt at multi-party democracy was made in 1994, as much as anything to gain some international legitimacy and plead poverty to sources of foreign aid, and for once that plea was a fair cop. Guinea-Bissau needed (and needs more) help. What they got was more instability. The Vieira-led elected government began to fall in 1998, with the outbreak of a Civil War that destroyed most all the remaining infrastructure of the interior of the country. Senegalese and Guinean (Republic of Guinea) troops intervened on the side of the “government” and most of the FARP (now the national armed forces) were on the side of the Army-based Opposition. Political intervention by the UNSC and ECOWAS promoted a cease-fire, and ECOMOG military “interposition forces” were sent in to mandate a separation of combatants. This “Ajuba Accord” (one of many agreements in West Africa by that name) called for a National Unity government and by March of 1999, foreign troops were on the way out. The United Nations, as a part of the Accord, had organized the United Nations Peacebuilding Office in Guinea-Bissau, known as UNOGBIS.

The then-Vieira government, however, did not last to see much peace-building going on: They were removed from power by a direct coup and replaced by a military junta in May of 1999. J. Vieira fled to the Portuguese Embassy and from refuge there signed an unconditional surrender on May 10th. By this time it had been pretty much proven that the Vieira government was the arms-trafficking agent that sparked the Civil War by arming Senegalese separatists (rather than the army leader who was publicly accused, starting the rebellion). But before J. Vieira could be tried, he slipped out of the country under an agreement to let him get medical treatment in France. The restored democracy then elected Kumba Iala of the opposition Partido para a Renovaçao Social (Social Renewal Party; PRS) won the Presidency in the November 1999 election. That lasted a little less than four incredible years, with constant insurrection, fighting, coup threats and counter-coup crackdowns, but finally one got done right and the Iala regime went into the history books at the hands of a military coup in September of 2003. Somehow, Iala was not simply killed, but was banned from politics for five years…

That, by the way, was probably regretted all around the region. In the spring of 2004, K. Iala was released from house arrest, and within a year was contesting his ban and denying his resignation as President. Only a personal intervention by the President of Senegal prevented another breakdown of civil order, and lo-and-behold, the result of the Senegalese interlocution was that Iala would throw his support behind the candidate of the PAIGC, who just happened to be… João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira, back from exile. He was then able to declare victory in the election and return to the presidency from 2005~present.

If this is all sounding like a tragicomedy set in a fictional banana republic, there is a reason. The nation was in ruins almost from its inception. The conflict over the decades has just made it all worse. Yet the few who are leaders of factions, playing one outsider off against the other for aid or protection, have pretty much made a mockery of the international effort to build *something* of purpose for the nation. It is pretty clear that with their history of arms-trafficking and general sneering at international conventions, the powers that be in Guinea-Bissau (of most any faction) are basically amoral.

Which brings us to part (2) of the answer to the question above: that there is a reverse flow now underway, from South America to Europe, that mirrors the old lines of communication and trade from the days of sail. That would be the delivery of enormous amounts of cocaine to the European illicit-market, in the main by aircraft that can cross over the Atlantic from the mouth of the Orinoco region, stage and refuel on the West African coast, and then fly on to southern points of entry into Europe. Antonio Maria Costa, Director-General of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UN ODC) wrote on March 9th this superb indictment of the recent popularization of cocaine in Europe and its potentially devastating effect on rule-of-law in West Africa. Before that, the Secretary-General himself had briefed the Security Council on the risks to peace-building efforts in Guinea-Bissau, in particular naming rising drug smuggling as a major issue. Antonio Maria Costa again brought this issue to the forefront in a briefing just this October to ECOWAS that called the situation “threatening to turn West Africa into a ‘cocaine highway’.”

Threatening does not even begin to cover the issue. The entire defense budget of Guinea-Bissau is about US$9.5 million, and pays for about 9,250 regular troops. A thousand dollars a year per active slot, even in West Africa, doesn’t buy much capability *or* loyalty. The average Latin American narco-terrorist outfit could buy that off with pocket change, and if unsubstantiated reports are true, they already have.

Last year’s interceptions totaled about 6 tons of cocaine, and given the state of border controls in the region, an interception rate well below 5% is likely (based on known arms and gem smuggling successes in the past). In comparison, the Caribbean region has interception rates between ~20% and ~45%, depending on route, so this is almost a sure thing for the smugglers to get safely through West Africa.

By the way, don’t expect overmuch U.S. involvement at the national level: the U.S. has not kept an Embassy in Guinea-Bissau since the 1998 Civil War (the Ambassador in Senegal has dual accreditation), and Guinea-Bissau has no representation in Washington D.C.

So when one reads stories in the news like *this* about more political violence in Guinea-Bissau, and even when you see reports like *this* from UN News claiming all went well in the latest election, realize that there is a big pile of money being waved around by bad guys again, and there is little question as to whether the factions in the country can be bought…

…the open question is simply the price to buy control of the stepping stone of West Africa…

…and whether the civilized world is willing to let them buy it.

***
End Notes:

Most all notes are embedded as links in the text.

UN Peacebuilding Commision: official home page

The CIA Factbook entry on Guinea-Bissau

Google Maps, showing Guinea-Bissau. Zoom out to see the location clearly vis. South America and Europe.

The following Wiki-p entries are for general reference only. Please check all sources.

General Overview on Guinea-Bissau

ECOWAS: the Economic Community of West African States

ECOMOG: the ECOWAS Monitoring Group (military)

General Information on the PAIGC party

General Information on the PRS party

Personal Profile: President João Bernardo "Nino" Vieira

Personal Profile: (the formerly-called) Kumba Iala