The Weekly N&C for November 10th, 2008

The Foot of Thailand

Here is a Global War on Terror trivia challenge for everyone: Name more than two Southeast Asian countries that have internal conflicts that have been recast in the last few decades from anti-authoritarian factionalism into battles of the world-wide Islamist campaign? The list probably starts with the Philippines, where a centuries-old conflict between the Moro ethnic group(s) and the Christianized central and northern islands has flared again with criminality and terrorism replacing the traditional goals of simple autonomy. Next would be the incredibly complex conflict issues that take form in Indonesia, the world’s largest Islamic country. There one can find all manner of historical conflicts from the Moluccas (Malaku Islands) Christianization to the role of the tolerant Hindu culture of Bali, but most all have taken a turn for the worst with the radicalization of the predominantly Islamic Javanese heartland in the last decades. But to name a third country, many will likely be reduced to guessing. Singapore, Malaysia and Brunei have all had brushes with Islamist elements trying to foment trouble or use places inside the countries for bases, but none qualify as separatist movements of any real note. But the Kingdom of Thailand has a situation rooted in the expansion of Great Siam two hundred years ago that has taken on a new bent in recent times. That would be the Southern Problem.

Pattani (Patani), or more correctly the three Thai provinces of Patanni, Yala and Narathiwat, are the modern remnants of the once independent Pattani Kingdom which existed from the late 13th to the late 18th Centuries, most of that time as a vassal state to Ayutthaya, the Siamese precursor kingdom. But unlike the north, central and even middle-south of what would one day be Thailand, the region including Pattani was populated by Malay peoples who had been Islamized since the 11th Century. The last period of Pattani independence was during the fall of Ayutthaya in 1761, but it was very short-lived as Great Siam rose from the ashes of defeat to reunify first all of the mainland and then to secure by final conquest the isthmus and the southern vassals. By the end of the 18th Century, the region was fully a part of the Kingdom of Siam, and remained so through the name-change to Kingdom of Thailand (1939) and on to the present day. Here is a map reference showing the modern borders and ethnic distribution.

The latest resurgence of Pattani separatism raised its head in 2001, roughly in coincidence to the larger outbreak of Islamic militant (Jihadi) violence worldwide, and for the first time the Southern Problem showed a distinctly more dangerous cast. A handful of separatist groups that had campaigned primarily politically, such as the Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO; active since 1968), were supplemented and in many ways supplanted by groups that raise the black flag of militant Islam’s Jihad. Most are local efforts that have become radicalized, but outsiders from Jemaah Islamiyah (who gained infamy from the Bali suicide bombings in 2002 and 2005) are believed to be active in organizing and training insurgents in Thailand’s South.

The nature of the separatist struggle also changed for the worse during the administration of then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, who at first (in 2002) attributed the rise in violence to non-religious causes. Ministers of the government hauled out the traditional “bandits” label in discussions, and they dismissed much of the problem as being related to drug-smuggling. That school of thought was dismissed after the April, 2005 bombings in Hat Yai and Songkhla cities which while causing relatively few casualties (2 dead ~60 wounded) inspired a panicked response. The airport at Hat Yai was closed for six months, and the national government decreed new powers to fight the insurgency. These in particular centralized authority in the Prime Minister’s office to direct military operations, suspend civil liberties and to censor the press.

Thaksin’s campaign was a blunt force response, and probably an unwarranted one as the insurgency then and now shows no sign of manufacturing a general threat to the nation, but the political damage was done. Militant actions could be cast in the light of defending local liberties as well as that of separatism, and Islamist recruiters found far more of the formerly moderate population to be willing to aid or join in their efforts. By September of 2006, the Bangkok Post claimed that more than 1,400 people had been killed in the previous three years of the insurgency, mostly bystanders.

The Thaksin regime was removed from power by a Royal Thai Army coup in September of 2006, and there was said to be a brief slowdown of separatist attacks in coincidence with the stated hopes of the Junta to open meaningful negotiations, but by November of that year, loss of life had reached over 1,800. Not much of a slowdown there.

The ongoing militant campaign(s) have gained a reputation for two particular features besides the obvious bombing and ambushing of government elements: They have taken on the goal of ethnic “cleansing” in their targeting of Thai portions of the population in villages, and have in a few cases succeeded in killing or driving into refuge the non-Muslim population of entire villages; and they have begun to target Education and Educators.

This latter is the most troubling, for it combines an intention of denying public education to the general populace (which leads to both a strengthening of the Islamic education system and a weakening of the general sense of nationality) with the particularly Islamic-Fanatic willingness to target women. A substantial percentage (arguably a majority) of the teachers in the Kingdom of Thailand are female, and the fact that they are (again, in the main) secular women makes them the most hated target of Islamic-Fanatics, the non-compliant female. The recent campaign of roadside bombings which also have killed troops of the paramilitary Rangers on patrol are intended as well to target teachers traveling to and from public schools in rural areas.

Atrocious as it is, this offers an opportunity to the government of Thailand to take a meaningful series of steps to change the course of the conflict. The bulk of the population, even in the contested area, is not yet under the thrall of Islamist factions. This means that a determined campaign of civil security and well-being can keep the doors of schools, banks and government offices open. That is what the people want, and what they need.

Nationwide, the people of Thailand are greatly opposed to social movements that deny education or attempt to place it under the control of opportunists, and the general population is still greatly supportive of the Royal Thai Army as a protector of the nation as a whole. Moreover, the Royal Thai Army is more than competent at those matters military that happen behind and in support of actual military operations; they have a demonstrated history of ability at logistics, civil engineering, and route security. What they lack is the will by the political class now entrusted (in the wake of the coup and reformed government) to make a serious commitment to making a determined effort to secure the provinces under threat, one by one and piece by piece if need be.

There are no large formations of insurgents to battle in the field. The largest confirmed separatist group can marshal between 300 and 500 fighters spread across a wide area of conflict. (Rumors of insurgent forces in the 10,000 range are propaganda reports)

This problem is one that is taken on from one end to the other, or in “ink-spots” in classic counter-insurgency thinking. The Royal Thai forces have the ability to secure villages, connect them with good roads, and then expand the security to cover the road courses. The Royal Thai forces can also provide heavy physical security to areas in the urban sectors as needed, and can keep a modest number of ready troops available to respond to any active insurgent effort to take territory, were such to ever happen. Neither of those are what wins a fight like this, though.

What wins is keeping the townspeople and villagers able to work their lands, move goods to market, and travel to school, and to do all of that in steadily improving conditions of safety.

If the government can avoid shooting itself in the foot (again) this time, the Foot of Thailand may yet be made safe.

Doing so would be a step toward making the whole region a lot safer from Islamic-Fanatic threats, as well.

The International Community should be most grateful, and find ways to help.

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End Notes:

Most all notes are embedded as links.

The following Wiki-p entries are for general information only:

The Moros of the Philippines

The Moluccas (now of Indonesia)

The historic Pattani Kingdom

General Information on the South Thailand insurgency

Personal Profile: former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra of Thailand

General Information on the PULO

General Information on Jemaah Islamiyah international Islamist group