Saturday, November 8, 2008

November 8th discussion item

When is it wrong for a uniformed officer to make a statement that is controversial, or even contrary to accepted national policy?

Never? -- that's the usual argument. Soldiers don't make policy in civilian-controlled armed forces, and all that.

What if what they stated was outside their area of responsibility?

What if what they stated was arguably a position taken on historical interpretation of some event related to the national military?

Here's the latest example:

The now former-Japanese Air Self-Defense Force Chief of Staff, Gen. Toshio Tamogami, took part in a politicized writing contest regarding Japan's role in World War II, taking the perspective of the apologist historians that claim Japan was "forced into the war". He won the contest, but when word got around, he was removed from duty. There were several not-entirely true items in his essay, and a couple patently false, but the official reason for his firing was his dispute of Japan having been labeled "an aggressor".

It was considered bad enough for regional diplomatic relations that his replacement, Gen. Kenichiro Hokazono (the former Defense Ministry intelligence chief, by the way) felt it was the first order of business to apologize to everyone who might have taken offense.

The only problem with this is, no matter how reprehensible the manipulation of history Gen. Tamogami portrayed was, the modern definition of "an aggressor nation" is pretty much a post-war construction of the attempts to find legal basis to prosecute the leaders of the various Axis nations. At what point in history does the legal concept of "aggressor nation" apply?

To pick the example of Japanese forces in kantoushuu, the Chinese Liaodong Peninsula and adjacent territories was "won" once in the treaty ending the 1894~95 First Sino-Japanese War, and "won" again in the treaty ending the 1905 Russo-Japanese War, and then leased under extant colonial conventions as a concession by Japan thereafter. Moral questions of colonialism aside for now, any question of claiming "aggression" in conflicts prior to the 1930's is doubtful, and certainly the Imperial Japanese military was perfectly legal in garrisoning the concession.

So was Gen. Tamogami discussing a point of historical interpretation (rightly or wrongly), or was he making policy?

...and should he have lost his job for doing so (either way)?

2 comments:

Tantalyr said...

You've asked several questions here, and I'll tackle them seriatim.

1) Obviously, the definition of an "aggressor nation" lies in the hands of the victor(s) of the ensuing war. In this case, I am sure that had Japan won the Pacific War, Japanese schoolchildren (if not schoolchildren all over the world) would be taught that Great Britain and America were the aggressor nations.

As in most cases, the objective answer is neither entirely one-sided nor entirely clear. I would suggest that FDR's decision to freeze Japanese assets, coupled with cutting off all American exports of metal, rubber and oil supplies, did much to exacerbate Japanese desires to retaliate. It can thus be argued that the Japanese viewed Pearl Harbor as much an act of self-defense as naked aggression.

A good illustration of how the labelling of the "aggressor nation" changes over time is the Mexican-American War. Shortly after the war, of course, Mexico was deemed to be the aggressor on the basis of its movement of troops to the Nueces River (which, by the way, Mexico deemed to be its border with Texas/United States). A half-century later, revisionist historians held sway with the view that America had actually started the war in a conscious land-grab effort. Today, however, "re-revisionist" historians now once again squarely place the moniker of aggressor nation upon Mexico (for reasons too long to go into here).

2) Was the officer merely interpreting history or making policy? Given postwar Japanese culture (at least as I understand it), he was doing both. Like Germany, Japan still suffers from a collective guilt, imbued initially by McArthur's administration of the occupation of Japan. To buck that instilled guilt by questioning its premise is to suggest (at the very least) a new Japanese cultural, if not political, policy of shedding the national collective guilt--something which, of course, could have a huge impact on Japanese foreign policy.

3) Should the general have been dismissed? This question opens a whole new can of worms, the precise answer to which devolves almost entirely upon the Japanese view (both culturally and politically) of freedom of speech.

America is veritably unique in its regard for freedom of speech. We guard that right more jealously than any other nation. For example, we are the only nation I'm aware of that constitutionally prohibits (except in extreme circumstances of national security) enjoining the publication of statements in advance of their actual printing and distribution.

Even so, American courts have long held that miltary personnel operate with far fewer liberty guarantees than civilians. That derives in large part from the high wall the Founders erected between the standing military and the government (another discussion best saved for another day). As a consequence, military superiors as well as the President, in his/her role as Commander-in-Chief, has every right (if not the duty) to dismiss officers who speak out against government policy. American history possesses a number of examples of this, perhaps the most famous being Truman's firing of MacArthur after the latter broadcast his offer to meet with Chinese and North Korean leaders in the field to discuss a ceasefire without clearing the offer with Truman in advance.

L.Douglas Garrett said...

Excellent!

I can assist with point (2) a bit:
There is no legal basis in Japan comparable to Holocaust Denial criminalization or the prohibitions against "glorifying" NationalSocialism, as there is in Europe. However...

As the terms of acceptance of the Treaty of San Francisco (1952) include recognition of the role of "aggressor" by Japan, it is strongly arguable that to refute that acceptance is to speak against the conditions of recognized Japanese sovereignty. As the Self-Defense Forces require an oath of loyalty to the Nation *as constituted*, a serving officer making such a claim may well be seen as a military (individual or collective) challenge to stated policy.

...and we are very strict about Civilian Control issues here.