That's what the Turks are claiming. Shades of 1998... although Assad-the-elder sold out the Kurdish Workers Party (PKK) that time to avoid a war with Turkey.
The PKK are a former Soviet tool and the worst of the bunch in the category of Kurdish nationalist movements. The more main-line parties in Iraqi Kurdistan realize they are disaster magnets and generally avoid even the appearance of cooperation with them.
The Turks are currently seeking a casus belli to justify intervention into Syrian territory... because they'd rather keep the Syrian rebel and refugee problems off Turkish soil (as much as possible) and they want to dictate the nature of the next Syrian government(s).
The Assad regime in Syria has a history of using national minorities as pawns.
The Kurdish 'nation' would, given the chance, love to have Eastern Syria... or Western Kurdistan... with 2 million Kurdish residents to be united with Iraqi Kurdistan in the pursuit of a viable nation-state.
The anti-Assad Syrian National Council has not cooperated with Kurdish anti-Assad organizers, apparently at the demands of the Turks.
Which seems to mean:
The Turkish fear of Kurdish national aspirations not only prevents them from raising a viable second front against the Assad regime in the Syrian Civil War, but may actually invite pushing the Syrian Kurds further into the arms of the regime to justify an intervention that has little to do with the eventual fate of the Kurds.
If, on the other hand, an obviously non-PKK faction could be raised in Eastern Syria and supported from Iraqi Kurdistan, the fall of the Assad regime could be greatly accelerated. But to do that involves Iraq and plays with nationalist fire.
Would either result better the situation? Tough call...